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I
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are Richard Lund and BCW
Enterprises, Inc. dba Warner Super Ford Store and Warner
Truckland.
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IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(3) (j).
V
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
WHERE ISSUES WERE RAISED
ISSUES
1.

Was it appropriate for the lower court to grant and

uphold default judgment against Richard Lund, based upon the
undisputed material facts which show said defendant was not a
party to the written contract plaintiff was seeking to enforce
in this action?
2.

Was it appropriate for the court to uphold the default

judgment against Richard Lund when it was apprised of the fact
that the real party in interest, defendant Karen Lund, had
included plaintiff's claim under an adjudicated bankruptcy
proceeding which rendered plaintiff's claim moot?
3.

Was it appropriate for the court to ignore the

applicable rules and case law in upholding the default judgment
even though it was apprised that Richard Lund was not legally
liable for the debt and that plaintiff did not pursue named co-

-1-
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defendant Karen Lund specifically because of its awareness of
the bankruptcy?
4.

Did the trial court err in upholding the application of

Rule 55, U.R.C.P., in this action and in ignoring the provisions
of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., those actions serving to violate
Richard Lund's due process rights?
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
As more specifically set forth in the argument section of
this brief, each of the foregoing issues are reviewed under a
correction of error standard.
WHERE ISSUES WERE RAISED
The foregoing issues were raised in Lund's ^Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,"
dated January 17, 1998,

^Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's

Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment, Default Certificate, Motion in Supplemental
Proceedings and Garnishment,"

and at hearing on the motion to

set aside default judgment, dated February 26, 1998.
VI
DETERMINATIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are:
(a)

Section 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(b)

Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration;

(c)

Rules 17, 19, 55, 58, 58A and 60(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure;

(d)

Article I, Sections 1, 3 and 7, Utah State
Constitution;

(e)

Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 8 of the United
States Constitution,

Copies of the foregoing are set forth in the addendum to
this brief.

VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS,
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT.

This is an appeal from a lower court order entered after
that court's decision granting default judgment to plaintiff on
December 23, 1997.

The lower court refused to set aside default

on or about February 26, 1998, in spite of the fact that
plaintiff's complaint was based upon a contract wherein Richard
Lund was a disinterested and non-participating party and that
written agreement had actually been entered into by and between
Rick Warner and Karen L. Lund, his ex-wife ten years before; and
in spite of the fact that the amounts claimed under that
contract had been dissolved under the bankruptcy of Karen L.
Lund.

It was further shown that plaintiff was aware of those
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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facts prior to the filing of the default judgment against
Richard Lund.
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVENT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

This litigation involves BCW Enterprises, Inc.'s efforts to
enforce a contract entered into by and between Rick Warner Ford
and Karen Lund, dated October 20, 1987, against Richard Lund who
was not a party to that agreement.

That Karen Lund discontinued

doing business with Rick Warner Ford in 1990, divorced Richard
Lund in May, 1991, and subsequently filed for federal bankruptcy
protection under case #93-20888, receiving discharge of debt,
including Rick Warner's claims, in 1993.
Karen Lund.)

(Exhibit *A", Aff.

That in November, 1997, Karen Lund was first

contacted about the current litigation, and was later advised
that she did not need to file any answer or appear in the case.
(Exhibit *A", paras. 7-9.)
That after plaintiff realized it had no viable claim
against Karen Lund, it proceeded to initiate the action against
Richard Lund, who maintained his own auto body repair shop and
had dealt with Rick Warner Ford, mostly on a COD basis, and with
no written contract or agreement in force, in the past. (Exhibit
*B", Richard Lund Aff.)
That Richard Lund had no prior knowledge of BCW
Enterprises, whatsoever.

Upon being served summons and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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complaint, Richard Lund contacted plaintiff's attorney and
advised him of the facts of the matter.

Mr. Swan, plaintiff's

attorney, informed Richard Lund that it would be easier and
cheaper to work out a deal than to proceed with litigation.
Having just completed a Chapter 11 reorganization himself and
paying substantial attorney's fees to get that done, and knowing
that he owed Warner Truckland a nominal amount of money, Richard
Lund was anxious to get this matter settled as economically as
possible.

Mr. Swan further agreed to prepare an installment

contract for Richard Lund's consideration and that he, Richard
Lund, needed to do nothing further in regard to the case,
pending receipt of that document.

(Exhibit *B".)

That thereafter, plaintiff's attorney failed to forward any
such agreement, but instead, filed the default notice and
judgment, sending required notice, after the fact, not to
Richard Lund but to Karen Lund's address.

(Exhibit *B", paras.

10-11.)
The court granted entry of judgment on December 23, 1997,
defendant Richard Lund filing his motion and memorandum to set
aside within days of receiving notice of that decision.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BASED
UPON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE MATTER
The parties in this litigation were aware that BCW
Enterprises was seeking to enforce creditor claims under a 1987
agreement which did not specifically include either BCW or
Richard Lund as direct and real parties in interest to that
contract, prior to the taking of default.

(Exhibits *A", *B".)

The document clearly and specifically identifies Rick Warner and
Karen Lund as the real parties in interest.

Further, plaintiff

became aware early on that, even if it could assume Rick
Warner's position under the contract, it could not proceed
against either Karen Lund or Richard Lund under breach of
contract claims under the contract. Additionally, no legal
basis was identified to substantiate a prima facie case against
Richard Lund for those amounts.

These factually undisputed

circumstances were addressed to the court by defendant on motion
to set aside and were sufficient, in the least, to set aside
default.

The trial court, however, elected to allow the default

judgment to stand, as filed.

Defendant Richard Lund asserts

that this decision constitutes err.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANT
KAREN LUND FURTHER SUBSTANTIATED
CAUSE TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
It also became clear from the material facts of the case
that Karen Lund acknowledged she entered into the contract with
Rick Warner in 1987, that she purchased goods from Rick Warner
until 1990, that she was divorced from Richard Lund in 1991,
and that she filed bankruptcy, acknowledging the debt claimed
in the current litigation as her own under that bankruptcy
filing, those creditor claims having been identified,
considered, addressed and released under the bankruptcy
proceedings in 1993.

(Exhibit *A".)

Under these circumstances,

there was no valid basis provided, in law, to justify
plaintiff's actions in pursuing Richard Lund in regard to this
claim.

The trial court erred in failing to recognize these

facts and to take appropriate action in this regard.
POINT III
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE
IS NO QUESTION THAT THE FACTS, RULES
AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW CALL FOR SET
ASIDE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
While set aside of default typically involves a
discretionary decision on the part of the court, the facts and
circumstances of this matter clearly call for set aside of the
default judgment. Aside from the fact that its actions served
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to contradict the determinations of the Federal Bankruptcy Court
in including and releasing the debt identified in the state
action (Exhibit 'A"), the lower court was also aware that
Richard Lund was not a party to the contract which was being
enforced, without explanation, to a party that provided no prima
facie evidence standing to even proceed with such litigation.
(Ref. hearing transcript,)
The trial court's actions are not consistent with Rules
55(c) or 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor is it
consistent with Federal Bankruptcy Court Rules.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT FURTHER QUESTIONS THE
VALIDITY OF RULE 55, U.R.C.P.
Rule 55(a), and 55(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provided plaintiff the basis for proceeding with default and
default judgment against Richard Lund.

The court's

acknowledgment of plaintiff's contentions under these rules
served to allow plaintiff a judgment against Mr. Lund, without
considering the validity of plaintiff's claims as contained in
its complaint, to consider the merits of the action as they
related to Richard Lund, or to take into consideration said
defendant's legal defenses.

Rule 55, U.R.C.P., is a rule

promulgated by the state court, not the state legislature, and
as such, violates Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 8 of the United
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Utah State
Constitution, and therefore does not constitute valid law
enforceable against Mr. Lund.
IX
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BASED
UPON THE FACTS OF THE MATTER
There is no question that BCW nor Richard Lund were not
parties identified under the written contract relied upon in
plaintiff's complaint.

BCW failed to establish itself as a real

party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a)/ U.R.C.P., nor was
Richard Lund established as a party in interest under Rule
19(a), U.R.C.P.

In fact, it has never been factually disputed

that only Rick Warner and Karen L. Lund were named in that
agreement.

(Exhibits *A", para. 1;

contract dated 10/19/87.)

Exhibit *B", para. 3;

Based upon Karen Lund's declaration

that she ceased doing business with Rick Warner in 1990, it is
also apparent that BCWfs attempts to collect, not filed within
six (6) years of accrual, expired under applicable statutes of
limitations (Utah Code, Section 78-12-23).

Plaintiff BCW failed

to establish any legal basis to proceed against named defendant
Richard Lund in this action.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiff later asserted, in response to defendant's motion
to set aside, an alleged 1997 telephonic agreement by and
between BCW and Richard Lund made on October 10, 1997, which
purportedly legitimized the default judgment.
Response in Opposition, p. 2.)

(Ref. Plaintiff's

Plaintiff acknowledges defendant

Lund contacted plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Swan, in an effort to
resolve the matter, and that a tentative agreement was discussed
to resolve outstanding debt due from Lund, this debt to be
reduced to writing, based upon a legitimate accounting from
Warner.

( Plntf's Resp., p. 2, Exhibit *B", paras. 13, 14, 15.)

Even if this action could be somehow construed to legitimize
BCW's claim, it is obvious from the facts submitted that there
was no meeting of the minds in this regard.
Richard Lund acknowledges that he had been independently
doing business with Warner Truckland on a COD basis for years,
and that those terms were altered without his request by Warner
Truckland as a result of the unsolicited, verbal extension of
credit by a Warner employee.

(Exhibit

*B".)

Richard Lund

further states that upon receipt of the summons and complaint he
contacted both Warner Truckland and Warner's attorney to resolve
any legitimate debt he was responsible for with Warner.
(Exhibit m B", paras. 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14.)

Mr. Lund did not

acknowledge responsibility for any of Karen Lund's prior debts,
but only his own distinct and separate obligations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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During

those conversations, Mr. Lund offered to forward $200.00 to
Warner immediately to reduce his account balance with Warner,
but was advised to wait until Swan forwarded a written contract
to him which outlined specific terms and conditions for payment.
(Exhibit *B" , paras. 13, 16.)

Swan agreed to have Warner

forward an accounting reflecting a balance and breakdown of
charges.

(Exhibit *B", paras. 13, 14.)

Swan failed to forward

either the contract agreement for Mr. Lund's review or an
accounting, but instead filed for the default judgment which was
granted, unbeknown to Lund.

(Exhibit ^B", paras. 15, 16, 18,

19.)
It is noted that at hearing on February 26, 1996, that
plaintiff's attorney avoided addressing the fact that the
default should only have been taken in regard to the written
contract referenced and attached to the complaint.

Instead,

plaintiff's attorney utilized the balances cited in the
complaint, but relied upon the purported verbal agreement
allegedly made on October 10, 1997, by and between Warner
Truckland and Richard Lund, to enforce his claims, an assertion
challenged by Richard Lund.

(Exhibit *B", paras. 11- 17.)

Mr.

Lund further swears to the fact that discussion of an agreement
between he and Warner involved reducing it to writing by
Warner's attorney, to be forwarded to him for review and
acceptance.

(Exhibit *B", Aff. para. 16.)

At hearing, the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court only acknowledged existence of attorney Swanfs affidavit
and gave no indication that it considered any sworn testimony
from defendant or Karen Lund, as contained in the affidavits
submitted in support of Lund's motion, or any other uncontested
material facts of the matter.
The court held in Atlas Corp. vs. Clovis National Bank, 737
P.2d 229 (Utah 1987), that if the contract is in writing and the
language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be
determined from the words of the agreement.

See Oberhansley vs.

Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).
In this instance, the original agreement which was attached
to the complaint as the simple and unambiguous contract between
Rick Warner and Karen L. Lund, clearly was the document that
should have been considered in regard to the default taken.
Even if the court determined that somehow Lund and BCW's
negotiations replaced the original basis for plaintiff's claims,
it failed to consider material facts which were contested by the
parties in that regard.

Even if the verbal discussions held on

October 10, 1997, were to be construed as a ""contract", no
express dollar amount, terms, interest or obligation involving
plaintiff's claims were referenced (Exhibit 1 B", paras. 13, 14,
15),

all of which were necessary to establish an agreement of

the parties.

Ref. Nixon & Nixon vs. John New & Assoc, Inc.,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982);

Winegar vs. Froerer

Corp.,

813 P.2d

104, 108 (Utah 1991).
Based upon these material facts, the default judgment
should have been set aside.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED
UNDER THE REAL PARTY'S BANKRUPTCY FILING
Plaintiff's complaint specifically identified Karen L. Lund
as a named defendant in this action and based its claims upon
debts accruing to her under a 1987 contract signed by her.
(Ref. complaint, attached contract.)
In her affidavit which was submitted to the court along
with Richard Lund's Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside, Karen
Lund acknowledged she executed the contact with Rick Warner,
dated October 20, 1987 (Exhibit *A", para. 1); that she ceased
doing business with Rick Warner in 1990 (Exhibit 'A", para. 2);
that she filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the State of Utah under case #93-20888
(Exhibit *A", para. 4 ); that Rick Warner was named as a
creditor in that bankruptcy proceeding (Exhibit "A", para. 5);
and that since receiving final discharge of that debt in 1993,
Karen Lund has not done business with Rick Warner (Exhibit *A",
para. 6).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That pursuant to Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, and under Case No. 93-20888, Karen L. Lund identified
debts accruing under the Rick Warner contract, under oath and
affirmation, as due and owing by her, named Rick Warner as a
creditor, noticed Rick Warner as a creditor and provided Rick
Warner with the opportunity to object to this discharge of debt
as required under 11 U.S.C. 523 (c) and 727 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Codes.

Rick Warner failed to enter any timely

objection to this discharge of debt.
Four years later, under a claim initiated by what appears
to be an alter ego, BCW attempted to collect this previously
federally discharged debt. Appellant contends that the debt
acknowledged by Karen Lund and Rick Warner under federal
bankruptcy case 93-20888, encompasses the same claims under the
current state court case and that the state court in this action
does not have subject matter jurisdiction to direct a default
judgment against Mr. Lund in this regard.
Under federal law in Title 28, Section 1334, Bankruptcy
Cases and Proceedings,

(a) "Except as provided in subsection

(b) of this section, the District Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11."

(b)

"Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a Court or Courts other than the District Court,
the District Court shall have the original but not exclusive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under Title 11/'
In Stevenson v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc., 794 P.2d 641
(Idaho App. 1989), it was held that those matters directly
relating to the debtor, or the bankruptcy petition and schedules
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
See:

L. & M. Bldg. & Supply, Inc. v. Soileau, La. App. 1965,

176 So.2d 756.
In Family Finance Corp. v. Secchio, 1970, 316 N.Y.2d 794,
65 Misc.2d 344, it was held that whether particular debt was
discharged in bankruptcy is normally for the court in which
discharge is pleaded is brought to decide.

See In Re. Davich,

Bkrtcy, S.D. 1983, 27 B.R. 888.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
It is clear from the record (re: Deffs Mtn/Memo to Set
Aside, Lund Affidavits, Complaint and 1987 Contract), that
Richard Lund presented substantial uncontested material facts
which supported the set aside of the default judgment entered by
the court.
It appeared from the court's questioning at hearing and its
decision that it had no prior opportunity to review and consider
the facts of the matter as referenced in Lund's memorandum,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reply memorandum or the supporting affidavits included
therewith.

A review of the hearing transcript also reveals that

while defendant, as a pro-se party, did identify issues
supporting his claims, his oral argument was not clear and
concise-

It is further noted that the trial court did not

ascertain the certain amount due as damages against Lund
(reference hearing transcript, p. 24).
Plaintiff focused upon his attempts to justify faulty
mailing of notices required pursuant to Rule 58A(d), U.R.C.P.,
and Rules 4-504(4) & (6), Code of Judicial Administration, and
arguments relating to the alleged "verbal contract" entered into
by BCW and Richard Lund, neither argument supporting valid
opposition to the set aside of default filed.

These matters

were referenced by Lund in regard to plaintiff's actions, and
constitute factual matters, but did not constitute Lund's sole
arguments.
It is clear from the record that default should have been
set aside under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Under Rule 55(c) it has been held that for good

cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
The courts have found that where any reasonable excuse is
offered by defaulting party, the courts generally tend to favor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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granting relief from a default judgment.

Westinghouse Elec.

Supply Co. vs. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah
1975).
In Downey State Bank vs. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507
(Utah 1976), it was found that the party seeking to set aside a
default judgment need only proffer some defense of at least
ostensible merit to justify a trial on that issue.
In Heathman vs. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah
1962), it was found that judgements by default are not favored
by the courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair
play.
In Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), it was determined that a default judgment
establishes, as a matter of law, that defendant is liable to
plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in the complaint
and must show by competent evidence the amount of recoverable
damages.
It has been held that judgment against defaulting party
must be reversed where plaintiff's claims for damages were not
for sums certain and a hearing was not conducted by the trial
court to ascertain the amount of damages to which the plaintiff
was entitled.

Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

The entry of a default judgment by a court with
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, where
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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there is no default in law or in fact, is improper and voidable.
P & B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
There is simply no question that plaintiff failed to make
any showing that either it or Richard Lund were real parties in
interest under the complaint, that this court had subject matter
jurisdiction to render a decision in regard to the claimed
damages, that plaintiff failed to ever establish damages for
sums certain at hearing or that a decision could be rendered in
regard to a later alleged verbal, telephonic agreement.
POINT IV
ENFORCEMENT OF RULE 55, UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
In the alternative, Lund presents the argument that Rule
55, U.R.C.P., the rule under which default judgment was issued
against him, does not constitute valid law.
Pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the
United States, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Under Article I,

Section 7, "Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States; if he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
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his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the Objections, to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of
that House, it shall become a Law/'

Under Article I, Section 8,

the House and Senate were designated "To make rules for the
government and regulations of the land and naval Forces" and "To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Office thereof."
Under the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 1,
"All men have the inherent and unalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their
consciences, to assemble peaceably; protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."

Article I, Section 3, "The State of Utah is an

inseparable part of the Federal Union and the Constitution of
the United States is the supreme law of the land."

Pursuant to

Article I, Section 7, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law."

Under Article

VIII, Section 4, "The Utah Supreme Court was empowered to adopt
rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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state and shall by rule manage the appellate process/'
(Effective July 1, 1985.)
Defendant Lund asserts that adoption of Rule 55, U.R.C.P.,
by the Supreme Court involves law that clearly and specifically
provides the vehicle for denying the fundamental right of a
citizen to full and fair access to the courts, involves a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, constitutes
an abdication of the duties of the legislative branch to the
judicial, identifies actions which subvert his unalienable
rights as a citizen and, in effect, identifies a law which is
repugnant to the United States Constitution.
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 176,
(1803), it was held that "All laws which are repugnant to the
Constitution are null and void."
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
"There can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.

"An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed."

Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US

425, 442.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear from the record that no sound basis in law or
equity existed for plaintiff to receive any judgment in this
action, even by default:

(1) Plaintiff failed to establish any

prima facie basis to assume an interest in the 1987 agreement it
brought suit under; (2) it failed to establish, on any basis,
that Richard Lund was a party to that contract; (3) BCW failed
to identify a basis for establishing subject matter jurisdiction
in the state court or justification for setting aside the
Federal Bankruptcy Court's prior discharge of the debt four (4)
years before;

(4) BCW failed to make a prima facie showing that

claims under that contract had not expired pursuant to Utah
statutes of limitations; (5) it failed to substantiate later its
later claim that Richard Lund was made liable for the previously
discharged debt under an alleged new verbal agreement
theoretically consummated over the telephone in 1997; and (6)
BCW failed to substantiate the specific dollar amount of its
claim against Lund.

Defendant also questions the very

enforcement of Rule 55, U.R.C.P., against him, based upon the
fundamental question of the enforceability of that law in this
instance.
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Based upon the material facts of the matter, the applicable
rules and supporting case law as referenced herein, Richard Lund
was entitled to the setting aside of default judgment in this
action.

For these reasons defendant respectfully requests the

court to grant his appeal.
DATED this /£)

day of January, 1999.

CI CHARD LUND
Defendant/Appellant Prb Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed first class,
postage prepaid, to plaintiff/appellee's attorney, Mark Swan,
RICHARD, SWAN & OVERHOLT, 6925 South Union Park Center, Suite
450, Midvale, Utah

84047, this / &

day of January, 1999.
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MARK S. SWAN
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Richard A. Lund
Defendant, Pro Se
376 West 800 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801)292-1780

z ;.:; 13:23

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

BCW ENTERPRISES, INC. dba
WARNER SUPER FORD STORE and
WARNER TRUCKLAND,

]\
]
]

AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN L. LUND

Plaintiff,
j

V.

RICHARD A. LUND and KAREN L.
LUND dba LUND AUTO REPAIR

\
]

Civil No. 970007274 CV
Judge Shiela K. McCleve

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY

}
} ss
}

I Karen L. Lund being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That Affiant executed a contract with Rick Warner dated October 20, 1987;
2. That on or about 1990, Affiant discontinued doing business with Rick Warner;
3. That on or about May of 1991, Richard A. Lund and Affiant were legally divorced;
4. That Affiant filed for Chapter 7 under federal bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the State of Utah under case #93-20888;
5. That Rick Warner was named as a creditor in that bankruptcy proceeding;
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6. That since receiving a final discharge of debt in 1993, Affiant has not done business with
Rick Warner;
7. That on or about the first of November, 1997, Affiant received a Notice to Appear at Court
from attorney Swan;
8. That Affiant has no recollection of being served a Summons or Complaint in that regard;
9. That shortly after receiving the Notice to Appear at Court, Affiant contacted attorney Swan's
office and was advised that she did not need to appear for she had been released from the case;
10. That in December, Affiant began receiving more legal documents from attorney Swan;
11. That in December, 1997, Affiant informed Mr. Lund that she was again receiving legal
documents from attorney Swan;
12. That Mr. Lund conveyed he didn't understand why Affiant was receiving any further legal
documents for attorney Swan advised him that Affiant was no longer involved. Further that Mr.
Lund indicated he had modified his agreement with Rick Warner in meeting attorney Swan's
demands and that the matter had been settled in October 1997. Mr. Lund said he was waiting for
the completion of the written agreement and was advised to do nothing until the agreement was
executed and that he had not yet received it. Mr. Lund stated to Affiant that he would find out what
was going on and take care of the problem;
13. That further Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this 19th day of January, 1998.

Karen L. Lund, Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 19TH DAY JANUARY, 1998.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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Richard A. Lund
Defendant, Pro Se
376 West 800 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801)292-1780

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

BCW ENTERPRISES, INC. dba
WARNER SUPER FORD STORE and
WARNER TRUCKLAND,

]\
]
]

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. LU

Plaintiff,
V.

j

RICHARD A. LUND and KAREN L.
LUND dba LUND AUTO REPAIR,

\
]

Civil No. 970007274 CV
Judge Shiela K. McCleve

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY

}
} ss
}

I Richard A. Lund being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That I specialize in auto body repair work and am not very sophisticated in the handling of
paper work. As a standard practice, I generally most everything in my metal desk at the shop. I do not
have a computer and find it near impossible to document every agreement or conversation I have with
vendors, customers ect. I have always relied upon the good faith between the parties and do not recall
ever before having a judgment entered against me;
2. That Affiant did not negotiate or execute the contract attached to the complaint dated October
20, 1987;
3. That on or about May of 1991, Karen L. Lund and Affiant were legally divorced;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4. That after Ms. Lund and Affiant were divorced, Affiant reorganized and acquired full
ownership rights to Lund Auto Repair;
5. That after Affiant reorganized the company, Rick Warner and Affiant agreed to reopen a credit
account based upon a verbal agreement between us;
6. That Affiant states "EXHIBIT B" attached to plaintiffs complaint and incorporated therein
fails to credit all payments etc. and disputes the balance indicated as owing;
7. That on or about July of 1997, after receiving attorney Mark S. Swan's first letter, Affiant
contacted Rick Warner. Affiant was advised that their had been changes with certain management.
Affiant explained the verbal agreement between he and Rick Warner which had been in force for years.
Affiant was reassured that they would proceed to deal with him on that basis;
8. While Affiant received a letter on or about August 1997, from Mr. Swan, to the best of his
knowledge this matter was being corrected by Rick Warner, pursuant to their agreement;
9. That on or about September 22, 1997, Affiant was served a Summons and Complaint
identifying a contract dated October 20, 1987, to which he was not a party of record;
10. That on or about October 10, 1997, Affiant contacted attorney Swan by phone and explained
the verbal agreement that had been in force with Rick Warner for years;
11. That during that phone conversation, attorney Swan declared he was aware of Ms. Lund's
bankruptcy and that as a result thereof, he and his client decided not to pursue her;
12. That in response to Mr. Swan's demands, Affiant agreed to alter his current agreement by
increasing his payments to $200.00 per month until he could pay off any valid portion owed, as soon as
the written agreement attorney Swan insisted on preparing was executed;

£v

I
13. That Affiant questioned how much of the alleged debt was interest charges;
14. That to date, Affiant has never received a full accounting of charges, credits and interest
charges and he disputes
the validity of "EXHIBIT B" attached to the complaint;
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15. That upon offering to send a payment, attorney Swan advised Affiant not to do anything until
attorney Swan forwarded the newly drafted agreement he insisted on preparing;
16. That Thereafter, Affiant never received a copy of the agreement that was to be prepared by
attorney Swan nor any other documents until the motion and order he received January 5, 1998 and the
copies of documents he obtained himself from the court house January 7, 1998;
17. That on or about December 1997, Ms. Lund informed Affiant that she was again receiving
copies of legal documents from attorney Swan;
18. That on or about late December, 1997, an attempt was made to locate the case at the court
house. However, the first attempt was unsuccessful due to the fact the case had been filed under BCW
Enterprises, an entity Affiant was not familiar with;
19. That on January 5, 1998, Affiant was served a Motion and Order in Supplemental proceedings;
20. That on January 7, 1998, shortly after receiving the motion and order which contained the case
number, Affiant went to the court house and was surprised to learn that a Default Judgment had been
obtained against him for he does not recall ever before getting a Default Judgment. In addition Mr.
Lund learned that a Notice of Plaintiff s Address, Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs, Default
Judgment, Default Certificate, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment, Application for Writ of
Garnishment all of which Affiant has no recollection of ever seeing all of which were prepared after
Affiant and plaintiffs attorney entered into an agreement to settle on or about October 10, 1997;
21. That further Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this 19th day of January, 1998.

Richard A. Lund, Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 19TH DAY JANUARY, 1998.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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Utah Code Ann. (1996). See also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
However, this Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was poured-over from the Utah
Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals.
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IV. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This proceeding is an appeal from an order issued by the Honorable Pat Brian
dismissing appellant's action. Judge Brian concluded, inter alia, that the action was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. His decision, however, clearly violates the rules of stare
decisis and precedent.

V. RELATED PRIOR APPEALS
Prior Appeals. This is the third appeal in this old divorce case. However, this is the
first appeal by Mrs. Kessimakis. Mr. Kessimakis has previously appealed the lower court's
ruling twice and failed twice
In Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis. 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978), Mr. Kessimakis appealed
the Third District Court, Judge Hanson's decision finding him in contempt of court for
failing to pay alimony amounts specified in the divorce decree. The Supreme Court, Hall,
Jr., held, inter alia, that the contempt finding was proper and affirmed. The Court noted that
Mr. Kessimakis could not attack the Decree's fairness by appealing his contempt
punishment, but that, if appropriate, he should have filed a petition to modify.
In Kessimakis vs. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976), Mr. Kessimakis, who
consented to entry of default judgment against him in the divorce action, appealed an order
of the Third District Court, Bryant J. Croft, refusing his motion to set aside the default. The
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Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that although the default judgment did not become final until
three months after its entry, its entry did start the running of time within which to take appeal
or to file a motion to set aside the default; and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to set
aside its decree where defendant's motion was not made until five and two-thirds months
after the judgment had been entered. He affirmed the lower court's ruling.

VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Once ownership in a corporation is declared in a final divorce decree, can

such ownership expire by the passage of time?
B.

Is a party estopped from utilizing the statute of limitations as a defense

where that party hilled the rightful owner into inactivity until after the limitation period
had run?
C.

Does refusal to transfer an ownership interest in a corporation by the

transferor create a constructive trust on behalf of the transferee?
D.

r

Did the court err in finding that there was sufficient evidence to determine

that the plaintiff was paid for her interest in the corporation?
E.

When a party fails to plead statute of limitations defense is it error for the

trial court to allow the affirmative defense?

V
F.

Where the Domestic Commissioner makes a finding under the Judge's

direction and there is no objection filed, does that finding bind the trial court?
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G.

Did the lower court err in not sanctioning the defendant for discovery

violations?

VII. STATEMENT OF CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from Judge Pat Brian's lower court ruling entered October 16, 1997
dismissing appellant's Motion for Order to Show Cause, for Contempt, for Judgment and to
Require Payment or Property (%onveyance. See copy of Motion attached herewith as
Appendix A and incorporated herein. Appellant Betty Kessiinakis (''Mrs. Kessimakis")
sought in part to enforce her ownership rights under the Divorce Decree entered between the
parties in 1974, awarding Mrs. Kessimakis one-half of appellee Dale Kessimakis' ("Mr.
Kessimakis") interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., ("Kessimakis Produce") a family owned
business. See copy of Divorce Decree attached herewith as Appendix B and incoiporated
herein. Mrs. Kessimakis had sought various remedies, including a request for declaratoiy
relief and a money judgment.
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B. Course of Proceedings.
The Honorable Pat Brian concluded in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
that (1) the statute of limitations barred Mrs. Kessimakis' attempt to confirm her ownership
of half of Mr. Kessimakis' interest; (2) Mr. Kessimakis paid her for the interest which had
been awarded to her; (3) her contention that Mr. Kessimakis should be held in contempt for
failure to comply with discover requests was without merit; (4) Mr. Kessimakis did not
waive his affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, payment, release, accord and
satisfaction, or novation, and (5) Mr. Kessimakis' conduct did not constitute lulling or
othei'wise toll the statue of limitations. R.632-640. See copy of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order attached herewith as Appendix C and incorporated herein.

C. Summary of Relevant Facts.
Kessimakis Produce Inc. is and was a family business. The company was founded
by Mike Kessimakis. and by the time the parties to this case divorced in the 1970s it was
owned by Mike Kessimakis and his two sons, Dale (the Defendant, referred to herein as "Mr.
Kessimakis") and Gary Kessimakis. The company is a successful wholesaler of agricultural
produce.
Mrs. Kessimakis was awarded one half of appellee's interest in Kessimakis
Produce. Mrs. Kessimakis and Mr. Kessimakis were divorced on August 28, 1974. R19-21.
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In its Decree the trial court awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis equal portions of Mr.
Kessimakis' interest in the family business. The pertinent paragraph in the Decree presently
at issue states:

:

[The] Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate properties, the
following: ... One-Half (V2) interest of Defendant's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc. whether the same be evidenced by
stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to
execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the
transfer of such interest;

<
<

R. 20. Mrs. Kessimakis was first awarded one half of her former husband's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, and second Mr. Kessimakis was ordered to deliver to Mrs. Kessimakis
proof of that ownership.
Mr. Kessimakis appealed the Decree and lost. Infer alia, Mr. Kessimakis attempted
to overturn the lower court's decision concerning Mrs. Kessimakis' interest in Kessimakis
Produce.

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's order.

See Kessimakis vs.

Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976).
On the date the Decree was entered Mrs. Kessimakis became a 10% owner. It is
undisputed that Mrs. Kessimakis was an owner of Kessimakis Produce in 1980. R.338,410,
Tr. 75. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Kessimakis owned 20% of the company (10% which
was awarded to Mrs. Kessimakis). R. 336-337.*
Mrs. Kessimakis testified that she never received any evidence of ownership, such as
1

Note - this is a direct contradiction of previous testimony given by Mr. Kessimakis. See R. 48, Tr. 66.
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a stock certificate, from Kessimakis Produce. Tr. 12.

Mr. Kessimakis reinforced her

statement when he stated he did not know whether a certificate had ever been issued. Tr. 74.
Commissioner Judge Thomas Aniett found in a Minute Entry dated September 9, 1995, that
"Plaintiff [Mrs. Kessimakis] did not receive her 10% [in the company]". R.454. No
objection was filed to that recommendation/finding.
From 1978 to 1993 the parties discussed several times the need for Mr. Kessimakis
to give Mrs. Kessimakis a stock certificate documenting her ownership in Kessimakis
Produce. Throughout that time, Mr. Kessimakis repeatedly acknowledged the need to give
her the certificate, but stated repeatedly that he was afraid that doing so would cause
irreconcilable discord between him and his brother Gary, the other owner in Kessimakis
Produce. R.254, 365. He said he would make sure she was taken care of, however. Id. Mr
Kessimakis denies that such assurances were made.
Mr, Kessimakis did not deliver evidence of ownership in Kessimakis Produce.
Mrs. Kessimakis testified that she never at any time received any stock, money or other value
for her share of the company. Tr. 12. Mr. Kessimakis reinforced her statement when he
stated he did not know whether a certificate had ever been issued. Tr. 75.2 Mr. Kessimakis
repeatedly acknowledged the need to give her the certificate. R.254, 365. Moreover, there
is no evidence that stock certificates were ever issued to any of the owners of the company.

2

This is a direct contradiction of Answers to Interrogatories where Mr. Kessimakis swore that a stock
certificate was delivered to Mrs. Kessimakis in the spring of 1976. Tr. 74.
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In fact, no stock certificate for Kessimakis Produce has ever been produced. R.337.
Mr. Kessimakis assured Mrs. Kessimakis "constantly" that her share was taken care
of. Tr. 151-152. In fact, Mrs. Kessimakis testified under cross examination that she pleaded
with him to give her a stock certificate. He responded that such title of ownership would
cause family discord. Tr. 152. She believed that he was holding her position in trust for her.
Tr. 152.
Mike Kessimakis (father) knew of his daughter-in-law's ownership interest in the
company, Mrs. Kessimakis testified that Mike Kessimakis gave his son an extra 10% share
of his interest in Kessimakis Produce. Tr. 28-29. At trial, Mrs. Kessimakis testified (Tr.28)
and Mr. Kessimakis admitted under cross examination, that his father gave him an extra ten
percent of the company stock, above what he gave to Mr. Kessimakis' brother Gary. Tr.83.3
Mrs. Kessimakis testified that her father-in-law told her that the interest was so "Dale could
make the - honor the Supreme Court decision." Tr. 28. However, Mr. Kessimakis simply
retained the extra ownership interest and never passed it on to the intended beneficiary, Mrs.
Kessimakis.
In addition, Mr. Kessimakis testified that he set up a joint stock account at WilsonDavis (a local brokerage house) to financially assist Mrs. Kessimakis. Tr. 54-55. However,
there is no physical evidence supporting Mr. Kessimakis' contention that Mrs. Kessimakis

3

Note - this is a dirccl contradiction of testimony given by Mr. Kessimakis under direct examination . Tr.

65.
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received proceeds from that account. Tr.78,82. In fact, on re-cross examination, Mr.
Kessimakis admitted that most of the money located in that account was transferred into his
own personal account. Tr. 95-96.
Mr. Kessimakis has given conflicting accounts concerning his ex-wife's interest
in Kessimakis Produce. During the pendency of this action, Mr. Kessimakis originally
claimed that he "cashed out" his ex-wife's interest in 1980. Tr. 78.

Mr. Kessimakis'

statement is unsubstantiated. Then he changed his story in 1997. Since then he has claimed
that he did not pay her off with cash. He testified that the parties formed a joint stock
account, into which he was the major depositor, and from which Mrs. Kessimakis received
most of the money. Tr.58. That, he claims, was a way of buying out her interest in the
company. The evidence does not suggest this course of events.
Evidence does not suggest that a buy out ever occurred. Commissioner Arnett
recommended a finding that Mr. Kessimakis never bought out Mrs. Kessimakis' interest in
Kessimakis Produce awarded to her in the divorce decree. R.454. There was no objection
to that recommendation, and this became the order of the court and law of the case.
Mrs. Kessimakis testified that there was a joint tenant account set up set with a local
stock broker (Wilson Davis) after the divorce. Both parties put money into the account, but
the vast majority of its earnings were withdrawn by Mr. Kessimakis, and the account was
closed. Tr. 112-113. A key witness (the Wilson-Davis Broker) testified orally and by
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presenting an analysis of the account that both Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis placed money into
the account, but Mr. Kessimakis took the money out and closed it. Mr. Kessimakis testified
under re-cross examination that he redeemed significant portions of the joint account and
placed them in his own personal account as a personal matter. Tr. 96.4 He further testified
that there was no discussion about using the joint account to settle up Mrs. Kessimakis'
ownership interest in the company.
The court delayed in hearing this matter. On November 14, 1996 Mrs. Kessimakis
filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause, for Contempt, for Judgment and to Require
Payment or Property (Conveyance. This matter was set for evidentiaiy hearing on May 27,
1997. After a half-day hearing the court ordered a continuance. The court did not reconvene
the hearing until October, 1997. Evidence was submitted and the court took the matter under
advisement.
At the hearing. Judge Brian did not confront all the issues before him. Discovery
sanction issues remained outstanding, including lack of production of documents by the
defendant and attorney fees for Mrs. Kessimakis in compelling discovery. R.600. Judge
Brian did not consider these issues, even though he mandated the same in an Order dated
February 10, 1997.
The Court found against Mrs. Kessimakis. Judge Pat Brian signed the Findings

4

This is a direct contradiction to testimony given by Mr. Kessimakis under direct examination during
the hearing. Tr. 89.
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of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw with accompanying Order on October 16, 1997. R.632-640.
See copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order attached herewith as
Appendix C and incorporated herein.

VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mrs. Kessimakis asks this Court to consider the following arguments:
A.

In a court of equity, an ownership interest in a corporation founded on a

divorce decree is not defeated by the passage of time.5 The lower court was inconect in
dismissing Mrs. Kessimakis' Motion due to the statute of limitations.
B.

Mr. Kessimakis is estopped from raising the defense of statute of limitations

where he lulled Mrs. Kessimakis into inaction.
C.

Mr. Kessimakis held Mrs. Kessimakis' ownership interest in Kessimakis

Produce as a constructive trust when he, in contempt of a court order, refused to produce
evidence of ownership on behalf of Mrs. Kessimakis.
D.

The lower court erred when it found that Mr. Kessimakis had paid Mrs.

Kessimakis for the interest which had been awarded to her. The facts as presented at hearing

5

This is issue is likely a question of first impression
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evidence the contrary.
E.

The lower court erred when it found Mr. Kessimakis had not waived his

affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or
novation. He did not raise these issues in initial pleadings.
<

R

It was error for the trial court to raise the statute of limitations issue sua sponte,

when it had not even been asked to consider it by any of the parties.
G.

Mr. Kessimakis should be sanctioned for failure to comply with discovery

requests. A Domestic Commissioner found that he had violated the discovery rules.

X. ARGUMENT
A. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, AWARDED IN A DIVORCE
ACTION, IS NOT
DEFEATED BY THE PASSAGE OF TIME
The Honorable Pat Brian ruled that the statute of limitations may erase coiporate
ownership when one is awarded that interest in a divorce decree but does not take delivery
of the stock within the eight (8) year statute of limitation period. This precise question
presented is likely one of first impression.
In reviewing legal decisions in equity, the Court reviews the lower court's ruling "...
for coirectness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination." Price vs. Armour, 949
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P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997) citing Russell vs. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896
(Utah 1992).
It is well established that Utah's eight year statute of limitations applies to past due
unpaid installments for alimony and child support. A judgment may be rendered for the
arreages only within the eight year period. Seeley vs. Park, 532 P.2d 684, 685 (Utah 1975).
The question before this Court is: does the eight year rule also dissolve an awarded
ownership interest in a corporation?
In a divorce action in Utah, the trial court has broad discretion to equitably divide
marital property. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a "divorce action is highly
equitable in nature." See Lord vs. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983) and Harmon vs.
Harmon, 491 P.2d 231 (Utah 1971). See also, Englert vs. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah
1978), where the Utah Supreme Court stated in relation to property rights in divorce actions
that "propertyfcasmay be equitable/ encompasses all assets of eveiy nature possessed by the
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived."
As a court of equity, the trial court is allowed considerable discretion in the division
of marital property, so long as it exercises this discretion in accordance with the standards
set by the appellate courts. Munns vs. Munns, 790P.2d 116,118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The
Utah Supreme Court has defined the factors for the trial court to consider in equitably
dividing property. Inter alia, the court cited (1) the amount and kind of property to be
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divided, (2) whether the property was acquired before or during marriage, (3) the parties
standard of living, (4) duration of the marriage (5) what the parities gave up because of the
marriage. Burke vs. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). In essence, the general purpose
of property division is to allocate property "in a manner which best serves the needs of the
parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Id.
Presently, the case for equity and justice has received a serious set back. It is
undisputed that Mrs. Kessimakis was an owner of Kessimakis Produce in 1980. R. 338,410,
Tr. 75. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Kessimakis owned 20% of the company (10% which
was awarded to Mrs. Kessimakis). R. 336-337. Mrs. Kessimakis testified that she never
received any evidence of ownership, such as a stock certificate, from Kessimakis Produce.
Tr. 12. Mr. Kessimakis reinforced her statement when he stated he did not know whether
a certificate had ever been issued. Tr. 74. Commissioner Thomas Arnett found in a Minute
Entry dated September 9. 1995. that the "Plaintiff [Mrs. Kessimakis] did not receive her 10%
[in the company]." R.454.
Mr. Kessimakis repeatedly acknowledged the need to give her the certificate. R.254,
365. Moreover, there is no evidence that stock certificates were ever issued to any of the
owners of the company including Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis. In fact, no stock certificate for
Kessimakis Produce has ever been produced for any owner. R. 337. Mr. Kessimakis assured
Mrs. Kessimakis "constantly" that her share was taken care of. Tr. 151-152. In fact, Mrs.
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Kessimakis testified under cross examination that she pleaded with him to give her a stock
certificate. He responded that such written title of ownership would cause family discord.
Tr. 152. She believed that he was holding her position in trust for her. Tr. 152. Given the
evidence received by the court at the evidentiary hearing it is difficult to understand why the
lower court did not seek do to equity.
As a question of first impression, Mrs. Kessimakis asks the Court to consider case law
from other jurisdictions. Although sparse, the cases are instructive. For instance, the Idaho
Supreme Court in a similar case ruled that the statute of limitations did not apply where the
rights in a non-vested pension fund were partially awarded to a non-working spouse. The
fact that she waited until after the statute of limitations period had run to assert those rights
did not subject her to the statute. Shill vs. Shill, 756 P.2d 140 (Idaho 1988). The court
attempted to do "equity" and provide for the retirement of the petitioner spouse, despite the
delay in bringing the action, because the property right at issue was presumed to be acquired
during the marriage /(/.at 143. In the instant case, the interest in Kessimakis Produce should
be presumed to have been acquired during marriage and declared upon entry of the Decree
of Divorce.
^

The appellate court of Florida has stated that an ct[a]ction for alimony and equitable

distribution [of property] is equitable therefore not subject to any statute of limitation."
Johnson vs. Johnson, 676 So.2d 458 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1988). In the Johnson case, the
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Johnsons were married in England in March, 1960. In April of 1993, Mrs. Johnson filed her
complaint in a Florida court seeking a lump sum alimony award. Mr. Johnson defended with
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reasoned that since this
was an equitable matter and one concerning a propeity right, the statute of limitation did not
apply.
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court has jurisdiction to include orders
relating to children, property, debts and obligations of the parties. U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-5. The
court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
distribution of propeity as is reasonable and necessary. U.C.A. Sec. 30-4-5(3). \n Jefferies
vs. Jefferies, the Utah Supreme Court defined a marital asset "as any right that has accrued
during the marriage to a present of future benefit." Jefferies vs. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837
(Utah 1988). The courts of Utah have continuing jurisdiction over disputes concerning a
marital asset.
The C.J.S. states concerning divorce actions:
[A] delay in bringing suit may be excused by lack of knowledge
of the offense, poverty of the complainant, the belief that the
other spouse had already acquired a valid divorce, or
unwillingness to involve members to the family of in family
difficulties...
Laches does not bar a divorce action where the grounds asserted
constitute a continuing cause of action.
27A C.J.S. Divorce, Section 94.
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The trial court, by dissolving Mrs. Kessimakis' interest in Kessimakis Produce, has
in effect invoked the doctiine of laches. Accordingly, without analyzing the justifications
as mentioned above, the court barred a continuing cause of action in a divorce proceeding
and has effectively "slammed the door" on Mrs Kessimakis' interest.
Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in
controversy, but will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would be
defeated but for intervention.

B. A PARTY IS ESTOPPED FROM UTILIZING STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AS A DEFENSE WHERE THAT PARTY
LULLED THE RIGHTFUL OWNER INTO INACTIVITY.
The Honorable Pat Brian concluded that the weight of the evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing supported a finding that Mr. Kessimakis had not lulled or otherwise
prevented Mrs. Kessimakis from asserting her rights of ownership in Kessimakis Produce.
This finding is clearly erroneous.
The standard of review is whether a party has marshaled the evidence in support of
findings, and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence. Shepherd vs. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1994).
"Estoppel" means that a "party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to
[the] detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and act accordingly."
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis Appeal Brief16
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Graham vs. Asbnry, 540 P.2d 656, 658 (Ariz. 1986). "Estoppel in Pais" is the "doctrine by
which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had." Mitchell vs.McIntee, 514
P.2d 1357, 1359(Or.App. 1985).

a

Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment
will be made may create an estoppel against pleading statute of limitations. Rice vs. Granite
School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversaiy
into a false sense of security, thereby subjecting her claim to a bar of limitations and then be
heard to plead that delay as a defense to an action when brought. Id. See also, Broadwater
vs. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993), French vs. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah
1965), Madsen vs. Matlsau 276 P.2d 917 (Utah 1954).
In the instant case. Mr. Kessimakis is estopped from asserting the statute of limitation
defense by the doctrine of estoppel in pais, because of his conduct in lulling Mrs. Kessimakis
into inactivity. It is undisputed that Mrs. Kessimakis was awarded Vi of Mr. Kessimakis'
20% interest in Kessimakis Produce. It is clear that Mr. Kessimakis had a duty to honor the
order of the Third District Court. From 1978 to 1993, the parties discussed several times the
need for Mr. Kessimakis to give Mrs. Kessimakis a stock certificate documenting her
ownership in Kessimakis Produce.

Throughout that time, Mr. Kessimakis repeatedly

acknowledged the need to give her the certificate, but stated repeatedly that he was afraid
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that doing so would cause iireconcilable discord between him and his brother Gary, the other
owner in Kessimakis Produce. R.254, 365.
Mr, Kessimakis has given conflicting accounts concerning his ex-wife's interest in
Kessimakis Produce. As the facts herein indicate, during the pendency of this action, Mr.
Kessimakis originally claimed that he "bought out" his ex-wife's interest in 1980. Tr. 78.
Mr. Kessimakis' statement is unsubstantiated. Then he changed his story in 1997. Since
then he has claimed that he did not pay her off with cash. He testified that the parties fonned
a joint stock account, into which he was the major depositor, and from which Mrs.
Kessimakis received most of the money. Tr.58. That, he claims, was a way of buying out
her interest in the company.
The buy out never occurred. Judge Brian asked that Commissioner Arnett hold a
Hearing to permit Mr. Kessimakis to present evidence supporting his claim that he gave Mrs.
Kessimakis her interest in Kessimakis Produce, and/or that he bough her out. At the hearing,
Mr. Kessimakis offered no evidence. Commissioner Arnett recommended a finding that Mr.
Kessimakis never received her interest in Kessimakis Produce as awarded in the divorce
decree. R.454. There was no objection to that recommendation, and this became the order
of the court and law of the case.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Kessimakis testified that there was a

joint stock account set up set with a local stock broker (Wilson Davis) after the divorce.
Both parties put money into the account, but the vast majority of its earnings were withdrawn

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis Appeal Brief 18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by Mr. Kessimakis, and the account was closed. Tr. 112-113. Mr. Kessimakis testified under
re-cross examination that he redeemed significant portions of the joint account and placed
them in his own personal account as a personal matter. Tr. 96.
There is no evidence, other than Mr. Kessimakis' testimony, that the joint account
was initiated for the purpose he suggested. He has changed his testimony and has been
caught in deceit on the witness stand. Mrs. Kessimakis' testimony, however, never faltered
throughout the proceeding.

She continued her forthright and consistent testimony

throughout. Despite this, the lower court adopted his position in total.
Clearly the evidence suggests that Mr. Kessimakis, by continuing to comfort, cajole
and deceive Mrs. Kessimakis. is precluded from pleading statute of limitations as defense to
the complaints laid against him.

C. REFUSAL TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN A
CORPORATION BY THE TRANSFEROR CREATED A TRUST
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE TRANSFEREE.
Mr. Kessimakis held the ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce as a constructive
trust when he, in contempt of a court order, refused to produce evidence of ownership on
behalf of Mrs. Kessimakis. Instead, they agreed for years that he would hold her interest for
her. This creates an express and/or constructive trust.
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in absence
of any express or implied intention to form a trust. Mattes vs. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177
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(Utah 1988).
A trust raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law, as distinguished from an express trust.
Wherever the circumstances of a transaction are such that the
person who takes the legal estate in propeity cannot also
enjoy the beneficial interest without necessarily violating
some established principle of equity, the court will
immediately raise a constructive trust.

t

Constructive trusts do no arise by agreement or from
intention, but by operation of law, and fraud, active or
constructive, is their essential element. Actual fraud is not
necessary, but such a trust will arise whenever circumstances
under which propeity was acquired made it inequitable that
it should be retained by him who holds the legal title.
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1353. The Utah Supreme Court has impressed upon litigants
constructive trusts as illustrated in Carnesecca vs. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977).
In Carnesecca, the Supreme Court held that "a constructive trust is an equitable remedy
arising by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment." Id.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that a constructive trust is proper in property
settlement proceedings in divorce cases. St. Pierre vs. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).
In St. Pierre, the Supreme Court held that where an ex-husband used harassment, threats of
bodily harm and physical abuse, and intimidation to force her to sign documents which
resulted in substantially reducing her share in propeity settlement and in preventing her from
contesting allegations in divorce complaint, a cause of action for a constructive trust stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
-
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The lower court was appraised of the theory of constructive trust. Mrs. Kessimakis,
pled constructive trust in, inter alia, her Memorandum in Support of Objection [to]
Commissioners \s Recommendations, R. 351. The lower court chose to ignore the concept
completely. R.632-639. Without comment, the trial court totally embraced opposing
counsel's recommendation as to a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that did not
address this theory of relief. R.632-639.
Mr. Kessimakis has held Mrs. Kessimakis's interest in Kessimakis Produce in trust,
for years. Mr. Kessimakis has "unclean hands". Mr. Kessimakis has given conflicting
accounts conceniing his ex-wife's interest in Kessimakis Produce. During the pendency of
this action, Mr. Kessimakis originally claimed that he "bought out" his ex-wife's interest in
1980. Tr. 78. Mr. Kessimakis' statement is unsubstantiated. Then he changed his story
in 1997. Since then he has claimed that he did not pay her off with cash. He testified that
the parties formed a joint stock account, into which he was the major depositor, and from
which Mrs. Kessimakis received most of the money. Tr.58. That, he claims, was a way of
buying out her interest in the company. The evidence does not suggest this course of events.
Evidence does not suggest that a buy out ever occurred. Commissioner Aniett recommended
a finding that Mr. Kessimakis never received her bought out Mrs. Kessimakis' interest in
Kessimakis Produce awarded to her in the divorce decree. R.454. There was no objection
to that recommendation.
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Further, Mrs. Kessimakis testified that there was a joint stock account set up set with
a local stock broker (Wilson Davis) after the divorce. Both parties put money into the
account, but the vast majority of its earnings were withdrawn by Mr. Kessimakis, and the
account was closed. Tr. 112-113. Mr. Kessimakis testified under re-cross examination that
he redeemed significant portions of the joint account and placed them in his own personal
account as a personal matter. Tr. 96." He further testified that there was no discussion about
using the joint account to settle up Mrs. Kessimakis' ownership interest in the company. Yet
the lower court found that he did.
Mr. Kessimakis wrongfully and consciously deprived Mrs. Kessimakis her interest
in the company. Thus, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, Mr. Kessimakis should be
deemed to be a trustee for the beneficial use of Mrs. Kessimakis, who has been wrongfully
deprived of her property.
Moreover, *[t]he certificate of the corporation for the shares, or the stock certificate,
is not necessary to the existence of the shares or their ownership. It is merely the written
evidence of those facts.

It expresses the contract between the shareholder and the

corporation and his co-shareholders." United States Radiator Corp. vs. State, 101 N.E. 783,
785 (1913). Therefore, stock certificates are not the same as stock shares and, in fact,
shareholders need not actually possess share certificates to assert their shareholder rights.

fo

This is a direct contradiction to testimony given by Mr. Kessimakis under direct examination during
the hearing. Tr. 89.
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See Utah Code Ann. Sec. 16-10a-625 (1995) (stating "[sjhares may but need not be
represented by certificates[;] rights and obligations of shareholders are not affected by
whether or not their shares are represented by certificates.^ " 11 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations, Sec. 5097 (1995).
In fact, the esteemed Judge Learned Hand, a member of the Second Circuit Court,
ruled that a stockholder successfully transferred his shares of stock in a corporation even
though the "interest therein was without registiy on coiporate books." He stated that equity
imposed a constructive trust in the transferee's favor. Helvering, Commission of Internal
Revenue vs. Miller, el al. 75 F. 2d 474 (2d Cir. 1935).

R THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT MR.
KESSIMAKIS PAID HER FOR THE INTEREST WHICH HAD
BEEN AWARDED TO HER.
The facts as presented at hearing evidence the contrary. No credible evidence has
been presented by Mr. Kessimakis lo suggest that he adhered to the divorce decree either by
presenting evidence of ownership or cashing her out.
As stated earlier, Mr. Kessimakis has "unclean hands." He gave has given conflicting
accounts concerning his ex-wife\s interest in Kessimakis Produce first claiming that he
"bought out" his ex-wife's interest in 1980, Tr. 78, and later claiming he did not pay her off
with cash. He finally testified that the parties formed a joint stock account, into which he
was the major depositor, and from which Mrs. Kessimakis received most of the money.
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Tr,58. That, he claims, was the buy out of her interest in the company.
Commissioner Amett recommended a finding that Mrs. Kessimakis never received
her interest in Kessimakis Produce awarded to her in the divorce decree. R.454. There was
no objection to that recommendation, and it became the order of the court and law of the
case. , -,-;..:.:..

E, THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND MR.
KESSIMAKIS HAD NOT WAIVED HIS AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, PAYMENT,
RELEASE, ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, OR NOVATION.
Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and was waived when it was not raised
in Mr. Kessimakis'responsive pleadings.

:j

"In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively laches,
statute of limitations and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
Rule 8(c), URCP. Failure so to do waives the statute of limitations as a defense. Tygesen vs.
Magna Water Co., 375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962) (when plaintiff responded to counterclaim
without mentioning the 30 day statute of limitations, the time limit is waived). See also
Bezner vs. Continental Dry (Icancrs, Inc., 584 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) (where answer failed
to allege waiver of fraud, the defense of the waiver was itself waived under Rule 12(h),
URCP).
The defense of statute of limitation was raised by Mr. Kessimakis only after
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Commissioner Thomas Aniett found sua spontc that the statute applied in this case. Statutes
of limitations are not jurisdictional as the commissioner supposed. See American Coal Co.
vs. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). Such statutes may easily be waived. Id. See also,
Staker vs. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1988).
Mr. Kessimakis responded to his ex-wife's petition with two distinct documents.
Neither raised the issue most basic to affirmative defenses.7

F. A TRIAL COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO RENDER
DECISIONS ON ISSUES NOT PRESENTED BEFORE IT FOR
DETERMINATION.
Generally, a trial court may not dismiss an action when neither party has sought
dismissal and there is no notice or hearing on whether there exists a justifiable cause for
dismissal. See Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Utah App. 1994).8
Dismissal was not requested by either party. In the Jenkins decision, this Court
continues:
Unless expressly granted authority to act on its own motion, a
trial court must typically limit its rulings to the motions
placed before it. A trial court has no authority to render a
decision on issues not presented for determination. Any
findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity.
Because Weis did not make a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court plainly erred when it dismissed Jenkins'causes of
Affirmative defenses "must be specifically mentioned or pleaded in the answer or they will considered
waived." Thomas. Utah Civil Practice. Sec. 8.02(3)(b)(ii).
8

Quoting Rubins v. Plummer. 813 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1990).
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action without first giving Jenkins notice and an opportunity to
argue against dismissal.
Jenkins, supra, 868 P.2d at 1382 (emphasis supplied).9 Cf, Pmess v. Wilkerson, 858 P.2d
1662-1663 (Utah 1993).
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate
and outside of the discretion given the governing tribunal
because it encroaches upon the advocate responsibility conferred
upon counsel. Furthermore, if a party fails to raise an issue and
present evidence regarding the same, it has waived the right to do
so.

Hilton Hotel Pacific Reliance Insur. v. Industrial Comm'n. Of Utah, 1995 W.L. 339186
page 4 (Utah App. June, 1995) (emphasis added). By not pleading affiiTnative defenses of
statute of limitation or laches. Mr. Kessimakis waived these defenses. In Hilton, this Court
declared a "nullity" the effort of the administrative tribunal to decide an issue (albeit properly
before it), but on grounds not urged by the parties. Id. at page 5.
The interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds
its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that
would otherwise be dead, it not having been litigated at the time
of trial.
*
Girardv. Appleby, 660 p.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983), quoted by Hilton Hotel, supra, at page
4; see also, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. vs. Utah State Tax Comm 'n., 847 P.2d 418, 420-421 (Utah
App. 1993) ("it was improper for the Commission to sua sponte raise and decide an issue

9

Authorities omitted were ('omhe v. Warren \s Family Drive-Inns, Inc. 680 P.2d 733. 736 (Utah 1984),
and the Pmess and Rule 7(b). URCP citations included in body of argument, above.
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that had not been raised by the parties").
"A trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented to it for
determination." Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Utah App. 1989 (Trial court not
authorized to grant relief not requested). Utah's leading case on sua sponte action by the
courts seems to be Combe v. Warren \s Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984).
That case stated:
It is an error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial
and unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged
to determine matters outside the issues of the case, and if he
does, his findings will have no force or effect. In law or in
equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by
the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to render a
decision on issues not presented for determination. Any
findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity. A court
may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by
the pleadings nor within the theory on which the case was fried.

Id., 680 P.2d at 736 (emphasis added, various citations to other states' courts omitted).
Until the matter was raised sua sponte by Commissioner Amett (R. 348), the issue
of statute of limitations as a defense to Mrs. Kessimakis' Order To Show Cause was not pled
by the Mr. Kessimakis. (See R. 328-332 for Mrs. Kessimakis' original Motion and R. 336347 for Mr. Kessimakis' Response).
In raising Statute of Limitations, and using it to dispose of the case, the Commissioner
rendered a decision based on issues not before the Court. Further, he dismissed the action
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(R.348), on argument that was not pending before the Court. The effect of this decision was
essentially to give Mr. Kessimakis notice that the statute of limitations was, in the mind of
the Commissioner, a plausible defense.

G. MR. KESSIMAKIS SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY REQUESTS.
A Domestic Commissioner found that Mr. Kessimakis had violated the rules of
discoveiy. R.479-482.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the lower court

judge found that Mr. Kessimakis had not.
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs a failure to cooperate in
discoveiy. Applying this Rule, Commissioner Amett sought to compel Mr. Kessimakis to
completely answer certain interrogatories and produce certain documents. He failed to do
so. Regardless of the outcome of the case, discoveiy sanctions should have been considered
by the lower court judge.
The Utah Supreme Court has state the following concerning discoveiy sanctions:
A party's conduct merits sanctions under this rule if any of the
following circumstances are found: (1) the party's behavior was
willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can
attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial
process.
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Morton vs. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997). Judge Brian chose not to
address the issue in despite of the fact that Mr. Kessimakis engaged in dilatory tactics
attempting to frustrate the judicial discovery process by the use of incomplete answers and
refusal toproduce documents. R.479-482. The Court should sanction Mr. Kessimakis and
award attorney fees as contemplated by Rule 37, URCP.

CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. First,
ownership cannot expire

The lower court erred in declaring the statute of limitations

applied to a property award in a court of equity, when to do so would cause irreparable harm
to one of the parties Though the case law is limited, equity dictates that, in order to fulfill
the intent of the divorce decree, under the evidence presented at trial, the statute of
limitations does not apply Originally, the Court ordered Mr. Kessimakis to transfer a Vi
share of his interest in Kessimakis Produce to Mrs. Kessimakis. It was evident at trial that
this did not take place. Equity dictates that this transfer, regardless of time span, occur.
Second, Mr. Kessimakis is estopped from pleading statute of limitations. The lower
court erred when finding that Mrs. Kessimakis was not lulled into complacency by the
actions of Mr. Kessimakis. Despite evidence presented at trial, the lower court found that
Mr. Kessimakis did not cajole Mrs. Kessimakis into inaction. The court accepted the
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argument that the Statute of Limitations applied, even though not originally pleaded and
never argued as an affinuative defense until a domestic commissioner, sua sponte, brought
the issue to the forefront.
Third, the lower court ened in not declaring that Mr. Kessimakis held the V2 interest
in a constructive trust on behalf of Mrs. Kessimakis. In contempt of a court order, he refused
to deliver evidence of ownership to Mrs. Kessimakis. A constructive trust is an equitable
remedy arising by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment. Mr. Kessimakis had an
affirmative duty to act and declined to do so, preventing Mrs. Kessimakis from her property.
Fourth, the lower court ened when its commissioner raised and mled on the defense
of statute of limitations sua sponte. A trial court has no authority to render a decision on
issues not presented to it for determination.
Fifth, it was improper for the lower court to base its decision on the doctrine of statute
of limitations when this affinuative defense was not pled and only argued after a sua sponte
dismissal bv a court commissioner.
Finally, the outcome of a case is not relevant to the imposition of contempt for
discoveiy violations. Mr. Kessimakis did not comply with a court order to produce answers
to interrogatories and documents essential to Mrs. Kessimakis' case. The court, in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLa\\\ ened in not finding and concluding that discoveiy
abuses took place during the pendency of this action.
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It is requested therefore, the Court reverse the trial judge's dismissal, and remand the
case with instructions to command Mr. Kessimakis to deliver evidence of ownership to Mrs.
Kessimakis, and to conclude that Mr. Kessimakis is in a violation of a court order and be
held in contempt. In the alternative, the Court should order a new trial to determine the
issues before this court.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of September, 1998.
$

Mitchell R. Barker
Thomas E. Stamos
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused an original and eight copies of the foregoing, pursuant
to Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to be filed with the Clerk of this Court,
and further, I caused two copies thereof to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this 4th day of
September, 1998, to the following address:
E. Nordell Weeks. Esq.
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis Appeal Brief 31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

;iv

I 0

M i t c h e l l R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
165 South West Temple, # 4 00
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 486-9638

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE, FOR CONTEMPT, FOR
JUDGMENT AND TO REQUIRE PAYMENT
OR PROPERTY CONVEYANCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D 14107 (DA)
^HnlHlO]
Judge £/*'* ^

DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff Betty L. Kessimakis, through counsel, respectfully
moves the Court for an order as follows:
1.

Awarding her money judgment against defendant Dale M.

Kessimakis

for

the

value

of

her

interest

in the business,

Kessimakis Produce Company;
2.

Fixing the amount or value of her interest in the company

and its assets, by evidentiary hearing if necessary;
3.

Confirming her ownership of such interest in the company;

4.

Compelling defendant to buy out and pay her for her

interest;
MOTION

FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE,
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5.

Finding him in contempt of Court for failure to convey to

her the appropriate interest prior to now;
6.

Order a business appraisal of Kessimakis Produce Company

at defendants expense;
7.

Ordering payment to plaintiff of suit money in the sum of

$2,000;
8.

Authorizing

the

employment

of

a

certified

public

accountant to assist plaintiff in this matter, with the cost and
initial retainer to be borne by defendant;
9.

Awarding attorney fees and costs and such other relief as

the Court deems appropriate; and
10.

Requiring defendant Dale Kessimakis to appear before the

Court at a time and place convenient to the Court, then and there
to show cause, if any he has, why the above relief should not be
granted to the plaintiff.
Respectfully so moved this 10th day of November, 1994.

Mitchell R. Barker, attorney for
Betty Kessimakis, Plaintiff
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil No. D 14107

(DA)

Judge fia-ja i^i
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

}

County of Salt Lake

J

Betty L. Kessimakis, being first duly sworn, comes now and
deposes and states as follows in support of her motion.
1.

Introduction.

this matter.

I am Betty Kessimakis, the plaintiff in

The statements made herein are true, and except as

otherwise indicated, are based upon my own personal knowledge.
2.

Relief Sought.

I request an order awarding me a money

judgment against defendant Dale M. Kessimakis for the value of my
interest in the business, Kessimakis Produce Company, an order
fixing the amount or value of my interest and confirming my
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ownership of such interest, an order compelling defendant to buy
out my interest, an order finding him in contempt of Court for
failure to convey to me my interest prior to now, an award of
attorney fees and costs and such other relief as the Court deems
appropriate.
3.

Background.

I was married to defendant for over sixteen

years, which marriage ended in divorce.

A Decree

of Divorce

was

granted to me in this case on August 28, 1974, by Hon. Bryant H.
Croft.
4.

Decree.

Defendant twice consented in writing that his

default be entered and waived service of process in that divorce.
The Decree was entered on the above date in 1974, and included the
following award to me:
"One-Half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in Kessimakis
Produce, Inc., whether the same be evidenced by stock
certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to
execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing
the transfer of such interest. . . . "
5.

Defendant executed no documents and took no steps to giv<

me my share of the produce business.
6.

Kessimakis Produce, Inc. is now and was at the time of th

divorce a very profitable business, with substantial value.
7.

Appeals.

Instead of delivering any interest in tt

business to me, defendant in 197 5 moved to set aside the divorc*
claiming in part that the property division was not proper
handled.
8.

The motion to set aside the divorce was denied.
Rather than conveying to me the interest or value in t
Affidavit
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of

Plaintiff

business, defendant then appealed the matter.
affirmed on appeal. Kessimakis

v. Kessimakis,

The order was

546 P.2d 888 (Utah

1976).
9.

After losing the appeal, rather than conveying to me my

share of the business, defendant moved for a modification.
the modification went to evidentiary hearing.

In May

On May 12, 1977 the

Court denied the petition to modify, and granted to me a motion for
contempt.

I was awarded $16,391.40 in unpaid support and alimony,

and he was found in contempt.
10.

Defendant also appealed that order, and the trial court

was again affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.
11.

Failure to convey interest.

To date defendant has still

not conveyed or paid to me anything for my share of the business,
but has instead continued to operate it and live from it, along
with his brother.
12.

I am unemployed, and am in serious need at this time of

the value that is owed to me.
So sworn this 14th day of October, 1994.
J^lxu; r\ i A A f
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Betti^/Kessimakis, Plaintiff/Affiant
On this fourteenth day of September, 1994, appeared before me
Betty Kessimakis, the affiant, who is personally known to me, and
who signed the foregoing in my presence ^rnKupon her oath.
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|/*lota^y Public, Salt Lake Co.

/My Comm Expires APR 25.1996 [
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Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 500 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. No, 521 - 8220
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

/• h

BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
(
)

DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

(

DECREE OF DIVORCE.

/

Civil No. D-14107

)

The above entitled matter having been heretofore heard and
the Court having acquired jurisdictation of the Parties and of the subject
matter of this cause, and having decided the same in accordance with the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein, NOW THEREFORE,
pursuant to said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant
on the grounds of mental cruelty, said Decree to become absolute and final
at the expiration of three (3) months from date of entry of this Decree.
2 . The Plaintiff i s awarded the sole care, custody and control
of the minor children of the Parties, subject, however, to rights of visitation
by the Defendant at reasonable times and p l a c e s .
3 . That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and
separate properties, the following:
a . Residential dwelling at 4520 Atwood Blvd., Murray,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly described
as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Beginning at a point on the westerly side of Atwood
Boulevard, said point being South 3°12'15" East 265.58
feet and North 39°52'45 M East 825.18 to a County Monument
at the intersection of 4500 South and State Street / North
89°51' East along the 4500 South Street monument Line 1437.07
feet, South 0°02 , 45" West parallel with State Street 200 feet
and South 89°51' West 6.97 feet from the West 1/4 corner of
Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence South l ^ S ^ S " West along the West side
of Atwood Boulevard 90.46 feet; thence South 89° 51* West
170.63 feet; thence North 0 o 02'45" East 76.9 feet; thence
North 89°51' East 80.65 feet; thence North 0 ° 0 r 4 5 " E a s t 13.5
feet; thence North-89°5' East 93.03 feet to the point of
beginning."
together with all of the furniture, contents and appliances
contained in said family residence;
b . One-Half (1/2) of Defendant's interest in
Kessimakis Produce, I n c . , whether the same be evidenced by
stock certificate or otherwise and the Defendant is ordered to
execute and deliver appropriate instruments evidencing the
transfer of such interest;
c . One (1) 1969 Oldsmobile automobile presently
in the possession of the Plaintiff;
d. Personal effects, clothing and such items of
personalty as Plaintiff is in possession of.
4 . That the Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate
property, the following:
a . His personal clothing and effects;
b . One-Half (1/2) of the interest acquired by the
Defendant in Kessimakis Produce, I n c . ;
c . Such other items of personalty now in his
possession except as awarded to the Plaintiff hereinabove.
5.

That the Defendant is ordered and required to pay to the

Plaintiff as support of the three (3) minor children of the Parties the sum of
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per child per month from and after entry of
this Decree.
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6. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded alimony i n the sum of
Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, which the Defendant is ordered
and required to pay.
7. Defendant is ordered and required to pay all debts and
obligations incurred by the Parties during the course of the marriage
including the assumption and payment of the mortgage balances owing on the
family residence described hereinabove.
8. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant for
attorney's fees incurred herein in the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00)
together with costs of this action.
DATED, this %%

day of August, 1974.

BY THE COURT:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT-:^.^!^'^-'
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BETTY KESSIMAKIS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
CASE NO.

D4^§7DA

v.

DATE:

9 OCT. 1997

DALE KESSIMAKIS,

JUDGE:

PAT B. BRIAN

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court at trial on October 2, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, District Court Judge, the Court sitting without a jury. The plaintiff Betty Kessimakis
appeared in person and wis represented by counsel Mitchell R. Barker. The defendant Dale
Kessimakis appeared in person and was represented by counsel E. Nordell Weeks.
FINDINGS
1.

The Decree of Divorce between the parties was entered on April 7, 1975.

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the plaintiff was awarded (among other assets)

"One-half (Vi) of the interest acquired by the defendant in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., whether the
same be evidenced by stock certificate or otherwise" and was ordered to "execute and deliver
appropriate instruments evidencing the transfer of such interest."
3.

Although appealed to the Utah Supreme Court twice (Kessimakis v. Kessimakis.

546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978)), the Decree of
1
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Divorce was not modified.
4.

On November 11, 1994, the plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause

seeking (I) a money judgment against the defendant for the value of her interest in Kessimakis
Produce (hereinafter the "Business"), (ii) an order fixing the amount or value of her interest in the
Business, (iii) an order confirming her ownership of an interest in the Business, (iv) an order
compelling the defendant to buy out her interest in the Business, (v) an order finding the
defendant in contempt for failure to convey her interest prior to the Motion, (vi) an order for
appraisal of the Business, (vii) a request for court costs, (viii) a request for costs for a Certified
Public Accountant to assist in fixing her amount of interest in the Business, and (ix) attorney's
fees.

• v-^P'
5.

'" •'•'" ;':

'

The above-stated Motion for an Order to Show Cause was the first legal action by

the plaintiff for enforcement of, affirmation of, or recovery of the assets awarded in the Divorce
Decree.
6.

The plaintiff had continuing knowledge that the defendant had not delivered

instruments evidencing the transfer of an interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
7.

The plaintiff failed to attend or request to attend any stockholder's meetings of

Kessimakis Produce, Inc. during all of the period subsequent to the entry of the Decree.
8.

Prior to November 11, 1994, the plaintiff failed to make any written or verbal

demand upon the company or to take any other meaningful action to exercise or demonstrate her
right of stock ownership or to request delivery of instruments evidencing such ownership.
9.

The defendant and plaintiff had communication with each other during all of the
2
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years since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
-. 10.

The defendant did not make representations or promises regarding the delivery of

the assets of the marriage which would constitute tolling, lulling, or a stay of the statute of
limitation.
11.

The plaintiff and defendant jointly managed a joint trading account in 1980 from

which both parties could draw funds.
12.

The defendant and the plaintiff established the joint stock trading account as a

device whereby the defendant paid the plaintiff in excess of $20,000 for her stock interest in
Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
13.

The plaintiff failed to take any action to recover the joint stock trading account

funds she asserts were converted to his use upon closing the account.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1) applies to

the matter before the Court.
2.

The defendant has not waived the statute of limitations defense, nor has he waived

his affirmative defenses for payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or novation. Testimony and
evidence in the pleadings and affidavits submitted by counsel and the parties show that these
issues were raised in a timely manner.
3.

The eight-year statute of limitation set forth in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-22(1)

began to run on June 2, 1978, the date of the conclusion of the second appeal on the Decree of
3
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Divorce.
4.

None of the defendant's conduct served to lull or otherwise toll or stay the statute

of limitation period.

11

5.

•

The plaintiff had eight years, absent a sustainable defense to the running of the

statute of limitation, to bring an action to compel receipt of title to stock in the corporation and
enforce the Decree.
6.

The plaintifTs Motion for Order to Show Cause (which wasfiledon November 11,

1994) constitutes an "action" under the language of Utah Code §78-12-22(1) and was an attempt
to enforce the Decree of Divorce
7.

The plaintiff failed to commence an action for enforcement of or execution on her

judgment awarded by the Decree of Divorce until shefiledher Motion for an Order to Show
Cause on November 11, 1994
8.

PlaintifTs action is untimely based on the statute of limitation and the facts,

evidence, and testimony presented to the Court.
9..

Utah Code §78-12-22( 1) is applicable to the matter at hand and bars the plaintiffs

Motion.

10.

ti . -ij

.

The facts and testimony indicate that the defendant did not waive the statute of

limitation defense or his affirmative defenses of payment, release, accord and satisfaction, or
novation.
11.

:\,.
The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiffs conduct has not constituted a
4
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lulling or otherwise toll of the statute of limitation period.
12.

The facts and testimony indicate that the judgment contained in the Decree of

Divorce entered herein has not been stayed, lulled, or tolled.
13.

The facts and testimony indicate that the plaintiff does not have a claim for laches

as relates to the statute of limitation period.
14.

The court is persuaded that in 1980 the plaintiff either received payment for the

awarded interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc. or had the legal right to either contest the
defendant's claim of payment or act to bring action to enforce the award granted in the Divorce
Decree.
15.

The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence and testimony to show that the

plaintiff was paid for her interest and in the less likely event that she was not bought out, she has
failed to contest the payment or enforce the rights under the Decree of Divorce within the statute
of limitation by failing to bring any action to enforce the Decree until November 11, 1994, nearly
14 years later.
16.

The plaintiffs cause of action relating to her affirmation of, collection of, request

for delivery of instruments evidencing ownership of, or any other action relating to enforcing the
Decree's award of "One-Half (Vi) of the interest acquired by the Defendant in Kessimakis
Produce, Inc." is barred.
17.

The plaintiffs contention that defendant should be held in contempt for failure to

comply with plaintiffs discovery requests is without merit. Pursuant to the order of this Court at
a meeting with the parties, all ongoing discovery was stayed and the parties were ordered to
5
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produce specific documents requested by this Court.

DATED this / f

day of

C'

C- r

4/fLfJ>\991

BY THE COURT:

^

&.-*4i

PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of
, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, first
class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing ORDER to:

MITCHEL R. BARKER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3530 South 6000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120-2610
E. NORDELL WEEKS
ERIC N. WEEKS
WEEKS LAW FIRM
320 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DATED this

day of

, 1997

Clerk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BETTY KESSIMAKIS,

ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

• /' '/ by/
•CrV

•JHl/fitL/'c'7

CASE NO.

Du*4*#7DA

DATE:

9 OCT. 1997

JUDGE:

PAT B. BRIAN

DALE KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER was called and heard at trial before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, District Court Judge, sitting without a jury. The plaintiff, Betty Kessimakis, appeared in
person and was represented by counsel, Mitchell R Barker. The defendant, Dale Kessimakis,
appeared in person and was represented by counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. The Court, having heard
the arguments, testimony, and evidence presented by the parties and witnesses, and having
conducted a review of the applicable law, legal precedent, and documents and pleadings on file
herein, and being fully advised thereto, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs action for enforcement of the Decree of Divorce is untimely and is
i

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff has no ownership interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc.
MADE AND ENTERED this / ?

day of October, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT^BRIAN y '
District Court Judge
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